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Much of the recent debate over race, genetics, and health has focused on the extent to
which typological notions of race have biological meaning. Less attention, however, has
been paid to the assumptions about the nature of ‘‘populations’’ that both inform
contemporary biological and medical research and that underlie the concept of race.
Focusing speciﬁcally on Africa in the 1930s and 1940s, this paper explores the history of
how ﬂuid societies were transformed into bounded units amenable to scientiﬁc analysis. In
the so-called ‘‘Golden Age of Ethnography,’’ university-trained social anthropologists,
primarily from Britain and South Africa, took to the ﬁeld to systematically study, organize,
and order the world’s diverse peoples. Intent on creating a scientiﬁc methodology of
neutral observation, they replaced amateur travelers, traders, colonial administrators, and
missionaries as authoritative knowledge producers about the customs, beliefs, and
languages of indigenous peoples. At the same time, linguists were engaged in unifying
African languages and mapping language onto primordial ‘‘tribal’’ territories. We argue
that the notion of populations or ‘‘tribes’’ as discrete units suitable for scientiﬁc sampling
and classiﬁcation emerged in the 1930s and 1940s with the ethnographic turn in social
anthropology and the professionalization and institutionalization of linguistics in Western
and South African universities. Once named and entered into international atlases and
databases by anthropologists in the U.S., the existence of populations as bounded entities
became self-evident, thus setting the stage for their use in large-scale population genetic
studies and the contemporary reinvigoration of broad claims of difference based on
population identiﬁcation.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
After a one-day public hearing in June 2005, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Nitromed
Inc.’s patent application for BiDil, a drug purportedly more
effective in treating heart failure among African Americans
(Kahn, 2007). While the approval and promotion of BiDil
speciﬁcally to African Americans has generated much
controversy over the meaning of race, the scientiﬁc quest
for the genetic roots of racial difference and geneticL. Braun), evelynn_
. All rights reserved.explanations of health disparities continues unabated
(Mountain & Risch, 2004). Why are genetic understandings
of race so resilient? And, what are the global implications of
this initially U.S.-centered, but increasingly international,
debate?
While typological notions of race have been largely dis-
credited, one dimension of race that has not been fully
explored is the relationship between race and what Lisa
Gannett (2001) refers to as ‘‘population thinking,’’ which
foregrounds the study of territorially deﬁned units, variably
described as ‘‘populations,’’ ‘‘tribes,’’ or ‘‘ethnic groups.’’ We
suggest that the insufﬁciently examined concept of ‘‘pop-
ulation,’’ which emerged in Europe linked to nation-state
formationat theendof theeighteenthcentury (Foucault,1976)
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delineated units, underlies and is conﬂatedwith the notion of
race deployed in various settings, be it forensic analysis, pop-
ulation genetics, biomedical research, ancestry testing, or
health disparities research. In this paper, we explore how
research in thehumansciences thatestablishedpopulationsas
closed systems, suitable for empirical investigation, inter-
sected with biological investigations of human difference,
especially in theﬁeldsofpopulationgenetics andbiomedicine.
As the locusofdebatesover theoriginsofhumans, a repository
of cultural stereotypes of famine, disease, and violence, and an
anthropological laboratory, Africa has occupied a position of
particular importance in the scientiﬁc imagination. For many
scientists, sub-SaharanAfrica is critical to theunderstandingof
human migration patterns, genetics of complex disease, and
racial disparities in disease (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 2003;
Kittles &Weiss, 2003; Tishkoff &Williams, 2002).
Focusing on Africa in the late nineteenth and the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century, we examine the speciﬁc role
of two expert knowledge systems – linguistics and social
anthropology – to track the production of the concept of
‘‘population,’’ ‘‘tribes,’’ or ‘‘ethnic groups’’ as bounded units
amenable to scientiﬁc sampling, analysis, and classiﬁcation,
and central to contemporary notions of race. We propose
that boundedness hardened from the early twentieth
century to the 1960s, as the linguistic and ethnographic
preoccupations of travelers, missionaries, and colonial
administrators became professionalized and institutional-
ized in British, African, and U.S. universities. Once named
and entered into international atlases and databases by
anthropologists in the U.S., the existence of populations as
distinct, naturally occurring, static formations became self-
evident, thus setting the stage for their use in large-scale
population genetic studies – and for the reinvigoration of
broad claims of human difference based on population
identity. Our purpose is not to deny the rich diversity of the
human species. Rather, the goal of this essay is to elucidate
the historical assumptions embedded in the unit of
analysis.
The Human Genome Diversity Project and the HapMap
To be useful in comparative genetic investigations,
populations must be isolated – geographically, linguisti-
cally, socially, and/or culturally – in a relatively unchanged
state over a long period of time, thereby constituting ‘‘gene
pools.’’ The requirement for isolation was evident in the
1991 call by leading population geneticists to organize the
Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), so insightfully
analyzed by Amade M’Charek (2005) and Jenny Reardon
(2005). Organizers of the HGDP pointed to an immediate
and vanishing opportunity to sample the world’s pop-
ulation diversity systematically, using the latest molecular
biological technologies. ‘‘The populations that can tell us
the most about our evolutionary past,’’ the authors write,
‘‘are those that have been isolated for some time, are likely
to be linguistically and culturally distinct, and are often
surrounded by geographic barriers.Such isolated human
populations are being rapidly merged with their neigh-
bors.destroying irrevocably the information needed to
reconstruct our evolutionary history’’ (Cavalli-Sforza,Wilson, Cantor, Cook-Deegan, & King, 1991, p. 490). For
organizers of the HGDP, the existence of ‘‘populations’’ was
given. It was simply a technical question of rapidly
assembling the requisite linguistic expertise to trace the co-
evolution of genes and languages and anthropological
expertise to prioritize the units for sampling and to
describe population characteristics relevant to genetic
research.
The idea that genes and language co-evolved builds on
linguistic theories that language groupings are ﬁxed and
bounded entities with a shared genetic ancestry, such that
language can be mapped with reasonable scientiﬁc
certainty onto anthropologists’ tribes (Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman, 2003). In lending the authority of science to what
had previously been unsystematic, but culturally powerful,
musings about human nature, groups and difference,
anthropological, linguistic and natural scientiﬁc theorizing
and practices played a vital role in producing African
groups as distinct and ﬁxed entities. Ethnicity was re-
vitalized for complex reasons in post-independence African
nations, making it difﬁcult for us in the early twenty-ﬁrst
century to view ‘‘tribes’’ or ‘‘ethnic groups’’ as socially
produced and therefore continually changing formations.
In 2002, Rosenberg et al. published the ﬁrst report using
a panel of cell lines assembled by the HGDP and the Centre
d’Etude of Polymorphisms Humaine (CEPH) (Cann et al.,
2002). On the basis of genotyping a mere 1056 individuals
from 52 ‘‘pre-deﬁned’’ populations, the investigators
claimed to have uncovered the underlying ‘‘genetic struc-
ture of human populations.’’ In a telling footnote, the
authors note that differences between groups might be
exaggerated if ‘‘isolated and geographically well-separated
populations [are used] to construct samples’’ (Rosenberg
et al., 2002, p. 2384) but argue that their sample did not
contain such a methodological ﬂaw. A map of sampled
populations in the supplementary materials, however,
reveals widely separated, continentally determined groups,
all with small sample sizes. Only six ‘‘populations’’ repre-
sent the entire continent of Africa. Importantly, assump-
tions related to population sampling are built into the
computer program structure used by population geneti-
cists, assigning individuals to populations, with the number
of populations (K) determined in advance by the user, thus
shaping interpretation of the data (Duster, 2006). There is
no evidence that the strong correlation between continent
of origin and the six genetic clusters (K¼ 6) reported by
Rosenberg et al. represented the most likely clustering in
their database (Bolnick, 2008).
What is pertinent to this discussion is that these authors
employed the language of ‘‘population,’’ not race, and left
unstated how populations were deﬁned in the initial
sampling protocol. The online supplementary materials to
a letter in Science announcing the availability of the cell lines
(Cann et al., 2002) do provide a map, a list of each pop-
ulation, its geographic coordinates, sample size, and gender
of sample but without a working deﬁnition of population,
who collected the samples, or when sampling was con-
ducted. Thus this very critical ﬁrst step in the design of such
a seminal scientiﬁc study remains a black box.
That continental clusters, however, were thinly
disguised surrogates for race was made clear when
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the study proved the existence of races. Citing interviews
with study authors, Wade asserted that ‘‘these regions
broadly correspond with popular notions of race.’’ Subse-
quently, numerous commentators have repeatedly invoked
these results as evidence for the ‘‘existence’’ of continen-
tally deﬁned racial groups (Burchard et al., 2003; Mountain
& Risch, 2004), while other scholars have subjected the
results to incisive critiques (Duster, 2005, 2006).
Analogous problems related to the unit of study plague
the HapMap project, a similar but distinct international
collaboration of over 200 scientists whose goal is to map
common patterns of human DNA sequence variation and to
identify genetic variants that characterize complex
diseases. Rather than undertaking the more laborious and
expensive sequencing of individual genomes in their
entirety, the HapMap project employs the ingenious tech-
nique of analyzing mutations in shorter blocks of DNA
called haplotypes (International HapMap Consortium,
2003). Although comparison of genetic difference by race,
ethnicity, or geographic location was not the primary goal
of the HapMap project, the Consortium nonetheless chose
to categorize their sample collection according to conti-
nental ancestry. In its ﬁrst publication, the Consortium
explicitly stated ‘‘no populations are typical, special or
sharply bounded’’ (p. 791). Nonetheless, at least loosely
deﬁned notions of boundedness informed the selection of
populations. The Yoruba became the representative pop-
ulationofAfrica, Japanese andHanChineseofAsia, andaU.S.
population from the state of Utah of Northern andWestern
Europe. Interestingly, criteria for assignment of member-
ship in a populationvaried by socio-cultural group– ‘‘for the
Yoruba, by asking the donor whether all four grandparents
were Yoruba, for the Han Chinese by asking the donor
whether at least three of four grandparents were Han
Chinese, and for the Japanese byself-identiﬁcation’’ (p. 791).
The method by which Northern or Western European
ancestrywas assessedwas left unstated. Despite the caution
of organizers, early scientiﬁc andpopular press reports from
this database afﬁrmed genetic difference between what
they referred to as ‘‘ethnic groups.’’ (McPherson et al., 2007;
Wade, 2005).
Language, missionaries and the invention of tribes in
Africa
These loose or nonexistent deﬁnitions of populations in
the scientiﬁc literature suggest that the idea of humans as
naturally organized into discrete populations, tribes, or
ethnic groups is deeply embedded in Western thought.
However, as historian Leroy Vail (1989) has shown,
ethnicity is not a simple reﬂection of a ‘‘traditional’’ or tribal
past insulated from historical change. Rather, in Africa
concepts of ethnicity were formed and re-formed during
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in response to
the social, political, and economic dynamics of African
societies, the rapid changes triggered by colonialism and
industrialization, and intellectual work in linguistics and
anthropology.
Prior to the twentieth century, in accounts that resonate
with rich, if offensive, ethnographic detail, travelers,European missionaries, and colonial administrators
embraced the project of producing knowledge about Afri-
cans, publicized their work in the metropole in museum
exhibits, books, pamphlets, and the popular press, and used
their understandings to guide colonial policy and resolve
metropolitan social anxieties (Coombes, 1995; Kuklick,
1991; Moore, 1993; Mudimbe, 1988). Working with African
intellectuals, Europeans conducted anthropological,
ethnological, and linguistic studies, writing the history of
tribes, constructing written African languages, and
describing the details of rites, customs, and religious
practices of indigenous peoples.
Initially reliant on interpreters, whom they did not trust
to accurately convey their message, missionaries placed
high priority on learning African languages and reducing
them to a written form (Moffat, 1844, p. 200). Soon after
settling among the Tswana in the 1820s, Robert Moffat of
the London Missionary Society, for example, created
a spelling book in Tswana and began translating the Bible
and other religious texts. In 1857, he published, printed, and
distributed the ﬁrst translation of the Bible. The process of
constructing a written language from an oral one, however,
was not a mere reﬂection of what Africans spoke but in the
case of Moffat involved turning one variant in the Tswana
language continuum into a written language, which served
to create the Tswana as a distinct group of people.
By the end of the nineteenth century, codiﬁcation of
language was a more sophisticated enterprise. To further
their evangelical work and unify their converts, Swiss
missionaries worked with African assistants in the late
nineteenth century to devise from the diverse languages of
the coastal peoples from south-east Africa, all of which had
been inﬂuenced by Zulu, Gaza, and Swazi, a single written
language and to teach this language in mission schools
(Harries, 1989). Operating within the conventions of print
culture, they created grammar, vocabulary, Bibles, and
literature.
Initially interested in entymology in his ﬁrst tour in
Africa, Swiss missionary and anthropologist Henri Junod
quickly found that ‘‘Man is inﬁnitely more interesting than
the insect’’ (Harries, 1981; Junod, 1927, p. 1). Mastering the
language of local speakers around the mission station at
Lorenzo Marques, he published a grammar of the Ronga
dialect in 1896 and the Djonga dialect in 1908 (Junod, 1927,
p. 29; Michler, 2003, pp. 46–58). Consciously scientiﬁc in its
methods and goals, his ethnography The life of a South
African tribe, complete with a color-coded map, was
important in labeling the ‘‘Thonga,’’ a geographically
dispersed group of people speaking a range of dialects, as
a single tribe, even though there was ‘‘no true national
unity amongst the Thongas’’ and they were ‘‘hardly
conscious that they form a deﬁnite nation’’ (pp. 14–15).
Acknowledging that ‘‘the word Ba-Thonga does not enjoy
much more favor and is not quite satisfactory,’’ he none-
theless thought ‘‘it ought to be accepted in the course of
time without much difﬁculty’’ (p. 16). For Junod, language
together with physical and mental characteristics deﬁned
the tribe.
But, as Patrick Harries (1989) points out (and as Junod
was aware), the term ‘‘Tsonga-speaking’’ in the nineteenth
century suggests linguistic coherence that did not exist. The
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by colonists to describe heterogeneous groups of migrants
speaking different language forms and holding different
cultural afﬁnities who ﬂed to the northern and eastern
Transvaal from southern Mozambique in the nineteenth
century to escape domination by the Zulu kingdom, civil
war in Mozambique, and ecological crises. Southern
Mozambiquan peoples, variously referred to as Gwambas,
Koapas, Tongas, Toka, Knowbnoses, Tchekes, Bonos,
Shangaans, were linked not by language but by their skills
as traders, their diet andmethods of food preparation, their
social organization and, importantly, their social exclusion
as foreigners in the Transvaal. Their patterns of settlement
were geographically dispersed with no unifying political
organization and, not surprisingly, they intermingled with
resident peoples. With their continued social exclusion and
alienation from the land, a sharp division of labor and
housing in the gold mines structured along tribal lines,
a Native Affairs Department that encouraged tribalism, and
a mission-educated petty bourgeoisie schooled in written
Tsonga, by the mid-twentieth century an ethnic
consciousness, which was consolidated by the Bantustan
system of the apartheid government, did indeed develop
among Tsonga-speakers (Harries, 1989).
In the 1890s in eastern Zimbabwe, the people who
gathered under Chief Makoni did not understand them-
selves as Manyika (Ranger, 1989). By 1930, a term that in
the pre-colonial period referred to a narrowly circum-
scribed political allegiance and later was re-deﬁned as the
Portuguese and British who competed for territory, came to
describe a cultural identity rooted in the primordial past of
a people composed of residents and settlers in a large
geographic area. This shift in identity over the course of
four decades required the standardization of a single
written Manyika language, with an orthography and
grammar, out of a range of dialects, which was undertaken
by missionaries of the American Methodist Episcopal
Church, the Anglicans, and the Trappist/Mariannhill Cath-
olics. Working in close association with African converts,
they wrote and translated religious works, folktales, and
literature. Each worked among people who differed in their
means of subsistence, interest in linguistics and literacy,
and receptivity to missionary work. In constructing a single
written language form, ‘‘differences were exaggerated’’ and
gradualism of ‘‘dialect zones’’ was erased (Ranger, 1989, p.
127). Despite competing interests, a Manyika identity was
consolidated in the 1930s under the pressure of the
migrant labor system as residents in eastern Zimbabwe
married ‘‘foreign women’’ and mission-inﬂuenced labor
migrants drew on this identity to survive the dislocation of
migrancy (Ranger, 1989, p. 140).
While promoting tribalism was certainly not an explicit
objective of missionary linguistic work, missionaries were
nonetheless working within a European system of knowl-
edge that produced what Harries calls ‘‘a pattern of domi-
nation’’ (Harries, 1987). Indeed, language was and is
a powerful constructor of communal memory (Makoni,
1998). The leap from linguistic group to tribes with deﬁned
characteristics and ﬁxed boundaries was but a short one in
ordering the universe. The pertinent point for this discus-
sion is that the pattern of domination that naturalizedpopulation groups as stable units of study erased a complex
history of intermingling of heterogeneous peoples in pre-
colonial and colonial Africa – or, in the language of pop-
ulation genetics, continued and constant gene ﬂow.
Despite the persistent efforts of the missionaries, stan-
dardization of African languages was only beginning in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fixing tribal
boundaries through language required institutional
support and a coherent research agenda, which came after
the First World War as language studies became institu-
tionalized in South African universities. The School of
African Life and Languages was founded at the University of
Cape Town in 1921, followed by the establishment of the
journal Bantu Studies in 1922 (Gordon, 1990). Funding of
the International Institute of African Languages and
Cultures (IIALC) in Britain, later the International African
Institute, by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie
Corporation provided stable support and encouragement
for African studies (Kuklick, 1991). Its journal Africa became
a major vehicle for the work of linguists and anthropolo-
gists. One of the ﬁrst tasks of the IIALC was to devise
principles for a uniform system of orthography (Hailey,
1938, p. 79).
Professional linguistics as a scientiﬁc discipline emerged
in South Africa in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century
as segregation was hardening. Figures such as C. M. Doke
and Gerald Paul Lestrade were proliﬁc in their study of the
languages of native people, serving on numerous govern-
ment committees and journal editorial boards. Like Junod,
language was a deﬁning characteristic of the tribes they
were studying (Lestrade, c. 1930). The principal concern of
linguists at this timewas to establish scientiﬁc principles to
unify and standardize the diverse languages of Africa.
Various government boards deliberated on the connections
between orthography and related classiﬁcatory projects on
race, language group and tribe (Report, 1926). With the
establishment of a sub-committee on language set up by
the Inter-University Committee for African Studies in 1932,
the study of African languages in South Africa, under-
standings of ‘‘tribes’’ and their relationship to the South
African government, became even more technically and
scientiﬁcally based (Doke, 1933). But, reality deﬁed the
experts’ classiﬁcatory schemes and pragmatic decisions
had to be made. In his now classic survey of Africa, pub-
lished in 1938, former colonial administrator in India Lord
Hailey dismissed physical characteristics as scientiﬁcally
useful in classifying African peoples. This left ‘‘language and
cultural traits.as a basis for ethnic classiﬁcation’’ (Hailey,
1938, p. 18). For Hailey, the main issue was how knowledge
of trained professionals could help colonial ofﬁcials main-
tain traditional forms of social organization and mitigate
the disruptive inﬂuence of Western civilization (Hailey,
1938, p. 1637).
‘‘Population thinking’’ and the emergence of social
anthropology in Africa
The increasingly technical debates amongst experts and
the exigencies of British policies of indirect rule would
ensure Africa’s strategic role as a laboratory for the
production of imperial knowledges in the twentieth and
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discussion is that professionalization of linguistics was
taking place at approximately the same time as anthro-
pologists took to the ﬁeld in Africa in large numbers,
overlapping professionally but using different methods to
deﬁne and investigate the unit of study. The typological
thinking of physical anthropology with its emphasis on the
study of racial origins dominated scientiﬁc discourse in
South Africa for the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth
century (Dubow, 1995). Beginning in the 1920s and
continuing into the 1960s, however, social anthropologists
of the functionalist school inﬂuenced both by Bronislaw
Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown1 turned to more
systematic study of African societies. The ahistorical func-
tionalist approach to anthropology required that social
systems be bounded, static formations. Consequently, early
studies were limited to ‘‘traditional,’’ rural societies.
Scholars have critiqued the complicated political history
of Malinowski’s functionalism and Radcliffe-Brown’s
structuralism–functionalism, their relationship to the
colonialist enterprise, and their internal dissensions (Asad,
1973; Cohn, 2004; Gluckman, 1940; Goody, 1995; Gordon,
1990; Hammond-Tooke, 1997; Kuklick, 1991; Kuper, 1996;
Magubane, 1971; Mudimbe, 1988; Stocking, 1984). Our
purpose here is not to rehearse these debates but to focus
attention on the unit of study deployed by social anthro-
pologists and how ethnographers both drew on pre-exist-
ing notions of populations and further hardened such ideas
through their ﬁeld studies and theoretical frameworks.
‘‘The question of the ‘unit of study’, far from being a meth-
odological nicety, is a consequential theoretical matter’’
writes John Comaroff. ‘‘For ﬁelds of inquiry are never
naturally given; they always reﬂect substantive assump-
tions about the constitution of the ‘real’ world’’ (Comaroff,
1982, p. 144). Importantly, the unit of study helps to
construct the ‘real’ world in ways that researchers them-
selves may not anticipate or intend.
While the intellectual core of functionalism and struc-
tural-functionalism is often located in Britain, it was social
anthropologists in southern Africa, such as Godfrey and
Monica Wilson, Isaac Schapera, Meyer Fortes, Max Gluck-
man, Winifred Hoernle, Richard and Eileen Krige, and Hilda
Kuper who, with funding from organizations in Britain and
the U.S., conducted extensive ﬁeldwork in Africa. They
went on to direct institutes in Africa, training many of the
ethnographers who would ultimately hold prime academic
positions back in the metropole (Goody, 1995; Kuper, 1996;
Schumaker, 2001).
Neglecting culture, at least initially – and, of course, not
totally – functionalists conceptualized human societies as
closed social systems, in which each element had a func-
tional relationship to the whole. They drew on Auguste1 Brieﬂy, functionalism refers to a theory of society developed most
extensively by Bronislaw Malinowski and his followers. Functionalism
takes an ahistorical view of society, holding that, like organisms, cultural
phenomena and institutions of societies form an interconnected whole to
fulﬁll the bio-psychological needs of the individual. Its variant, structur-
al-functionalism, whose early proponent Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown
was heavily inﬂuenced by Emile Durkheim, focuses on how the compo-
nent parts of society work together to maintain stable social systems.Comte, Herbert Spencer, and especially Emile Durkheim for
their theories of society and on the methods and practices
of the natural sciences to provide purportedly objective
accounts about the organization of human societies from
which they could deduce key principles (Malinowski,
1935). For social anthropologists, boundedness was
conferred by a synchronic framework in which social
systems were held together by ties of kinship and/or
political, legal, and religious institutions created to fulﬁll
needs, be they bio-psychological in the case of Malinowski
or social in the case of Radcliffe-Brown (Harris, 1968;
Malinowski, 1930; Radcliffe-Brown, 1946). In other words,
to take a functionalist approach, in which each of the parts
relate to awhole, the unit of study had to be de-limited. The
detailed diagrams, ﬁgures, tables, and detailed and
systematic ﬁeld notes of students of Malinowski gave
material form to their self-consciously scientiﬁc orientation
(Goody, 1995). Thus, published ethnographies, and the
visual imagery they deployed, cast societies as static,
resistant to change and, to varying extents, the people
inhabiting this social structure without history, even
though researchers found ﬁtting people’s customs into
a functional framework a difﬁcult task. In wrestling with
the signiﬁcance of African customs and social relationships,
Radcliffe-Brown, for example, wrote somewhat tentatively
‘‘there is at present very good empirical evidence con-
necting father-right with the cattle complex and mother-
right with agriculture. But I do not think we can yet show
any real functional correlation.The kinship systems will
give us the ﬁrst step in our analysis.after that wemight go
on to ancestor cults’’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1925).
South African-born Meyer Fortes, a leading ﬁgure in
British social anthropology for many decades, was unam-
biguous in his articulation of groups as self-contained. ‘‘A
group of people bound together within a single social
structure have a boundary, though not necessarily one that
coincides with a physical boundary or is impenetrable.’’
(Fortes, 1953, p. 22; quoted in Cohn, 2004, p. 202). Struc-
tures were, according to Fortes, ‘‘resistant to change’’
(Fortes, 1953, p. 23). For Radcliffe-Brown, culture was not
bounded but ‘‘the system of society was contained within
a territorially bounded community.’’ (Stocking, 1984, p.
172). Like organic life, social systems had a functional unity
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1935).
It is important to emphasize that social anthropologists
were not an intellectually homogeneous group slavishly
beholden to narrow theories of functionalism. Over time
ethnographers developed theories of social change and did
place social systems into broader contexts (Gluckman,
1940; Godfrey &Wilson,1945; Malinowski, 1929; Schapera,
1970) and wrote histories of South Africa (Wilson &
Thompson, 1969–1971). Nor were they insensitive to the
Africans they were studying. Indeed, social anthropologists
were a varied group from across the political spectrum,
who struggled, often with great personal compassion,
though of a decidedly paternalistic sort, to understand their
research subjects and to rigorously test their hypotheses
empirically in the ﬁeld. Monica Wilson, for example, was
a strong opponent of segregation and apartheid in South
Africa (Anonymous, 1973). The lived realities of ﬁeldwork
made them acutely aware of the shortcomings of the
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Schumaker, 2001). In correspondence with Winifred
Hoernle, Wilson remarked that the reality of ﬁeldwork
deviated from her theoretical training (Wilson, 1935).
Noting that linguistically related peoples merge with each
other, Elizabeth Colson acknowledges that ‘‘in a sense it is
probably false to regard the Tonga as a deﬁnite group or
a real unit which is set off by deﬁnite criteria from other
peoples.’’ Nor was the name ‘‘a common rallying point’’ for
the people themselves (Colson, 1951, pp. 95–96). None-
theless, she goes on to provide a detailed ethnographic
description of this ‘‘tribe.’’
Thus, in focusing on the ethnographic present, func-
tionalists were trapped, albeit uncomfortably, in a static
worldview of African societies, effectively ignoring the
history of movement and mingling of the people they
studied. By concentrating on descent as the organizing
principle of African societies, social systems were theoret-
ically conceptualized as closed structures or, in thewords of
Radcliffe-Brown, as systems of ‘‘ordered social relations in
a given collection of human beings’’ (Radcliffe-Brown,
1946). Movements of peoples in pre-colonial Africa (which
for population geneticists would lead to gene ﬂow between
populations) are minimized conceptually. Change, when it
occurred in ‘simple’ societies was considered to be slower
than that occurring in ‘complex’ societies, a consequence of
exogenous forces, such as colonialism, that reinforced the
notion of a static, pre-colonial past. This point is clear in
Godfrey and Monica Wilson’s The analysis of social change
based on observations in Central Africa (1945) which views
‘‘traditional’’ societies as only recently undergoing signiﬁ-
cant social change due to Western intervention.
Although anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard
developed nuanced understandings of the Nuer and
conceived of his work as countering the prevailing views of
colonial authorities (Evans-Pritchard, 1950; Goody, 1995),
Bernard Cohn rightfully counters that conceptualizing
African societies as organized into unchanging, bounded
entities according to principles of descent was a legiti-
mizing practice, enacted by social anthropologists, essen-
tial to maintenance of the social order under colonialism.
‘‘Unit, boundary, social structure, and group,’’ Cohn writes,
‘‘are the central concepts which appear time and time again
in the anthropological literature of the 1940s and the
1950s. A unit meant something that was observable on the
ground. Hamlets, villages, lineages, tribes were believed to
be bounded – they were countable and mappable, had
names, and above all had social structures – patterned
relations between groups. Groups were made up of indi-
viduals recruited on known principles, usually genealogical
connections which were thought to be ‘real,’ i.e., met
western concepts of descent traceable to common ances-
tors and expressed in themetaphor of ‘blood’’’ (Cohn, 2004,
p. 203).
A sense of urgency characterized the ﬁeldwork of social
anthropologists of the 1930s and 1940s for they were fully
aware that the spread of industrialization and colonial
interventions were changing indigenous societies rapidly
and irrevocably. They branched out from studies of rural
communities to urban settings and adapted their theoret-
ical frameworks to the new conditions (Schumaker, 2001).Radcliffe-Brown was so concerned with the rapid disap-
pearance of ‘‘untouched’’ societies that he urged the
Rockefeller Foundation to support a center for vanishing
cultures at Yale (Stocking, 1984, p. 168). By the late 1960s,
structural-functionalism was in decline. But, social
anthropologists’ social systems, deﬁned on ‘‘scientiﬁc’’
principles, survived. Anthropologists’ ‘‘tribes’’ could seam-
lessly double as geneticists ‘‘populations.’’
The systematizing project of George Peters Murdock
While social anthropologists began to critique the unit of
study in the 1960s, the assumption of populations as
discrete, bounded entities nonetheless hardened under the
systematizing project of the American comparativist
George PeterMurdock, who spentmost of his career at Yale.
Despite the many critiques of the theoretical framework
and substance of his work (Harris, 1968), Murdock was
highly inﬂuential in the history of anthropology. He served
as president of numerous anthropological associations, was
elected to the National Academy of Science in 1964, and
trained many students, a large number of whomwent on to
hold prestigious positions at U.S. universities (Ferraro,1992;
Goodenough, 1994). Murdock’s projects are of particular
relevance to this discussion as his work helped to shape the
conceptualization of population that informs contemporary
population genetics research, such as the HGDP.
Inﬂuenced by physicians and evolutionist anthropolo-
gist W. H. R. Rivers, Murdock had limited ﬁeldwork expe-
rience himself. From early in his career, he focused his
efforts on ordering the ethnographic knowledge of others.
Interested in cultural universals and statistical methodol-
ogies and animated by the desire to place the study of
society on a scientiﬁc basis, Murdock ﬁrst published
a summary of ethnographies in 1934. Later in the 1930s
with a team of assistants at Yale’s Institute for Human
Relations, he took on the mammoth task of creating the
Cross-Cultural Survey, an archive of ethnographies later
known as the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF).
Such a systematic effort, which incorporated ethnogra-
phies that were highly variable in quality and theoretical
underpinnings (Harris, 1968, p. 615) and were conducted
by ﬁeldworkers operating in a variety of sometimes
oppositional anthropological traditions, including those
as distinct as Franz Boas and Malinowski, nonetheless
facilitated statistical comparison of cultural traits by
researchers the world over. According to Ward Good-
enough, Murdock ‘‘seemed compelled to bring tidiness to
things so that problems could be clariﬁed’’ (Goodenough,
1994, p. 307). Through the mechanism of constructing
scientiﬁc databases, the complexity of the history of soci-
eties and the ethnographers’ interpretations of their
research, as well as the distinctions between physical,
social, and cultural characteristics of designated ‘‘tribes,’’
were almost completely erased.
In 1957, Murdock published the ‘‘World Ethnographic
Sample’’ (Murdock, 1957), followed by Outline of world
cultures in 1958 (Murdock, 1958), a compilation of groups
worldwide, distinguished by a simple coding system.
Several years later, he began to compile a more compre-
hensive coded atlas of the world’s peoples in Ethnology,
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number of societies available for cross-cultural analysis.
The completed Ethnographic atlas, which contained
a summary of 239 African societies organized into 85
clusters, was published as a single volume in 1967 (Mur-
dock, 1967). By codifying social, cultural, and economic
characteristics, such as mode of marriage, family organi-
zation, community organization, kin groups, settlement
patterns and so on into a simpliﬁed form suitable for entry
on punch cards and later into computer programs,Murdock
promoted statistical comparisons of various traits of world
societies. At the same time, he reduced dynamic societies to
static forms and erased the nuanced understandings of
social formations held by ethnographers. Indigenous
peoples’ own understandings of their history and their
societies, not surprisingly, had no place in this academic
endeavor. Identifying which cultures were essentially
independent and ordering them into clusters was an
organizational task reserved for anthropologists (Murdock,
1967, p. 3). Lost in this ambitious endeavor was the
essential problem of the unit of study. As Marvin Harris
(1968) writes: ‘‘The Files and all similar ethnographic
samples are plagued by difﬁculties in establishing the
boundaries of discrete socio-cultural systems.’’ (p. 615).
Although his own area of expertise was in North America
and Oceania, Murdock had a special interest in Africa. In the
mid-1950s he organized a graduate seminar at Yale onAfrica.
The outcome of these seminars was a book entitled Africa: Its
peoples and their culture history published in 1959, a book of
particular importance toCavalli-Sforza. Framedasa reference
guide, Africa is a highly readable text with a detailed index of
African tribes based on the abundant ethnographic work
accumulated on Africa in previous decades. In the preface to
the book, Murdock makes special mention of the ethnogra-
phies of Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Schapera, and Monica Wil-
son and draws on the accounts of social anthropologists,
linguists, and travelers throughout his text. The deﬁnition of
groups is unproblematic. ‘‘Tribes,’’ he writes, ‘‘are classiﬁed
into groups of essentially identical language and culture,
arranged numerically in alphabetical order, with reasonably
complete synonymies to facilitate identiﬁcation through an
index of tribal names included at the end of the book’’
(Murdock, 1959, p. ix). For Murdock, language was particu-
larly informative of ancestral relationship. Recognizing that
classical racial typologies were dated, he nonetheless
proceeds to describe the ﬁve races – Bushmanoid, Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, Negroid, and Pygmoid – that people the conti-
nent of Africa. Thus, we see continuous slippage between
populations, tribes, and races, which would plague the
theory, methods, and practices of population genetics.
To avoid the methodological errors of previous
researchers, Murdock deployed rigorous inclusion criteria
for his Ethnographic atlas. Societies were distinguished
based on language, ethnic identity, and geographical loca-
tion. To ensure greater statistical power, samples were
randomly selected. Murdock categorized north and north-
eastern parts of the African continent separately from sub-
Saharan Africa, a practice that would survive in the
analyses of contemporary population geneticists. (If
included, the neat picture of geographically deﬁned races
might disappear.) To ﬁnd the real Africa, it would benecessary to look below the Sahara. Once ordered in the
Atlas in the mid-1960s, societies of the world remain ﬁxed
in time, to be utilized by future researchers from other
disciplines, including geneticists.
Murdock’s treatise inﬂuenced future genetic researchers
in Africa, especially, for the purposes of our discussion,
Cavalli-Sforza. The hunter-gatherer groups described in
Murdock’s Africa: Its peoples and their culture history were
featured on the ﬁrst page of the introduction to Cavalli-
Sforza’s (1986) African Pygmies, a detailed compilation of
virtually all the studies conducted to date on population
structure, genetics, anthropometry, and other biological
characteristics of African ‘pygmies’ (1986). Importantly,
Murdock’s classiﬁcation of Central African pygmies framed
the conceptualization of pygmies as distinct groups and
guided sampling decisions. Cavalli-Sforza (2000) returns
again and again to Murdock, most recently in his popular
work Genes, peoples, and languages published in 2000.
Murdock’s Africa appears as one of only three references in
the draft document of the sub-Saharan Working Group of
the HGDP. While noting that ‘‘neither in the present or past
is there any simple correlation between ethnicity, language,
and gene pool,’’ the sub-Saharan Working Group nonethe-
less selected groups based on ethnicity and language, using
Murdock’smaps to determinewhich populations to include
on the ﬁnal list (Sub-Saharan Africa Working Group, n.d.).
The point here is that once ordered into databases, societies
of the world remain ﬁxed in time, serving as handy refer-
ence guides for future researchers from other disciplines,
including geneticists who are unaware of the complex
issues raised by the very construction of such a database in
the ﬁrst place.
Conclusion
The current taxonomy of African languages thus does
not reﬂect primordial ethnicities or point to racial group-
ings, despite the myths created by both Africans and
Westerners. Rather, knowledge of what we now think of as
African languages was produced in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries when European and American
missionaries, working closely with or against colonial
administrators and African intellectuals, initiated their
efforts to reduce a rich diversity of spoken dialects to
uniﬁed written forms. Language then was mobilized to
support or undermine ethnic and race consciousness,
depending on the social and political environments in
different regions of Africa.
During the so-called ‘‘Golden Age of Ethnography,’’
university-trained social anthropologists took to the ﬁeld to
systematically study, organize, and order the world’s
diverse peoples. Intent on creating a scientiﬁcmethodology
of neutral observation, they replaced amateur travelers,
traders, colonial administrators, and missionaries as
authoritative knowledge producers about the customs,
beliefs, and languages of indigenous peoples. At the same
time, linguists were engaged in an intensive project of
construction and standardization of African languages,
mapping language onto primordial ‘‘tribal’’ territories and
cultural units. Colonial knowledge systems were built on
dynamic, local pre-colonial and colonial social formations
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when incorporated into databases, it was European rules of
categorization that governed the organization of this
knowledge. Ordering projects, be they political, anthropo-
logical, linguistic, or biological in nature, erase the reality
that people have always been interacting, exchanging
goods, social ideas, culture, and genes (Goodman, 2007).
While these exchanges took a particularly brutal form in
the colonial interventions that profoundly and irreversibly
shaped the constitution of groups in Africa, colonialism did
not initiate the movement and mixing of peoples.
Given the history of the production of written
languages, ethnic consciousness, and tribalism in Africa,
one is left wondering on what historical evidence rests
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s claim that ‘‘most populations
are relatively isolated.although rare exchange of marriage
partners between groups does occur.Sometimes a whole
population (or a fraction of it) migrates and settles else-
where’’ (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 2003, p. 267). To the
contrary, historical evidence shows that populations are
not now and never were isolated, bounded entities; they
are actively produced and lived social formations –
appearing, disappearing, and re-appearing over time as
part of local and global socio-political and scientiﬁc
projects. Languages such as Tsonga, Manganika, or Zulu are
best understood as reﬂecting identities assigned to and
adopted by diverse groups of peoples in speciﬁc historical
contexts. Constructing these identities produced purity out
of mixture, something of great importance to Europeans. It
is certainly the case that ethnic identities have acquired
profound social meaning. It does not follow, however, that
these identities conform to cohesive biological units.
The particularity of African ‘‘tribes’’ described in this
essay exists in profound tension with Africa as a ﬂattened
geographic space through which the West has constructed
a world of lack and deﬁciency (Ferguson, 2006). The
simultaneity of these two visions is captured almost weekly
in colorful images of death and destruction on the front
page of the New York Times. However, whether trapped in
a discourse of sameness or difference, ‘‘research on Africa,’’
as Achille Mbembe (2001, p. 17) so eloquently states, ‘‘.has
underestimated the fact that one characteristic of African
societies over the longue duree has been that they follow
a great variety of temporal trajectories and a wide range of
swings only reducible to an analysis in terms of convergent
or divergent evolution at the cost of an extraordinary
impoverishment of reality.’’
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